Tuesday, May 1, 2018

The Dark Gulf between the FBI and the Technical Community

https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2018/o1803.pdf

I think it's important that we acknowledge and address that each side in the encryption debate does not believe so much that the other side is wrong, but that they are lying liers who will stop at nothing to get their way.

In particular, the contrast between Susan Hennessey/Stewart Baker's take on the FBI documents that got released about the iPhone unlocking debacle and the Risky.biz (and technical community) take are quite telling.

Risky.Biz, when speaking to their audience, essentially assumed that the FBI, while not misleading the court in words, knew that it could have reached out to the contractor base for potential solutions to unlocking Farook's iPhone, and that not doing so was highly dishonest when presenting that there were "no other solutions" other than the nuclear option of forcing Apple to build decryption capability for the FBI.

Susan Hennessey (and others in the national security space) take the FBI at their word: No misleading statements went to the court and "not having the capability in our hands right now" is enough to move forward with the legal case. "Perhaps there is some stovepiping issue but nothing even slightly duplicitous" we hear from that side. "If you only read the whole report, then you'll see!"

Here's what you see when you read the whole report: There are fig leaves of truth covering the massively weird idea that in the highest profile case in the country the FBI didn't ask the head of the ROU to have a contractor maybe look into the problem. It's literally unbelievable. "Oh, I thought we could only work on classified issues" is what's in the report, as if these teams don't have each other's cell phone numbers.

This is a damning two paragraphs in the report and it validates what the technical community thinks of the FBI.
You see the same dynamic with the Ray Ozzie cryptographic proposal. The national security teams that believe the technical community isn't being straightforward about how possible it is to build secure key escrow when clearly public key encryption exists don't believe they are wrong, they simply believe the technical community knows perfectly well how to build PKI and just won't for political reasons.

Matt Green points out the the issue is not "Can we build PKI?" but "Do we want to have companies forced to build PKI and assume the essentially unbounded liability of maintaining it?". Keep in mind, tech people have watched every PKI system they've built over the past 20 years fail in some way and companies have no desire to hold or control any data beyond that which gets them ad revenue.

Of course, Stewart Baker would then say "Unless the Chinese want it, in which case everyone seems to RUSH to find a solution". The technical community, in turn, says "But the USG is supposed to be our friends."

I'm not saying the technical community is right about these issues, although they clearly are: The FBI lied in all but words, and the "going dark" debate is insane when we can identify serial killers from their great grandparent's DNA.

But even if the FBI was right, we have to look strategically at what it means in every dimension of this debate when the US technical community and the FBI both don't trust each other even a tiny bit. Without solving this, how can we move forward on any part of the massive problems we face? How do you have public private partnerships without trust? How do you build cyber war norms? Infragard can only go so far...





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